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Abstract—In wireless ad hoc networks, all its nodes behave 
as routers and take part in its discovery and maintenance of 
routes to other nodes. Thus, the presence of selfish or 
malicious nodes could greatly degrade the network 
performance and might even result in a total 
communication breakdown. However, the majority of ad 
hoc networks secure routing protocols assumed that all 
nodes participating in the network are cooperative to 
support different network functionalities and did not 
provide a complete solution against these attacks. In this 
paper, we propose a cooperative secure routing protocol 
based on reputation system (CSRAN) for wireless ad hoc 
networks to defend against these attacks efficiently. It is 
based on ARAN secure routing protocol and detailed 
analysis is given to show it proves to be more efficient and 
more secure than original ARAN secure routing protocol in 
defending against both malicious and authenticated selfish 
nodes. 
 
Index Terms—Ad hoc networks, reputation system, secure 
routing protocol 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Due to the open wireless medium, the routing 
protocols of Ad-hoc networks are more vulnerable to 
various attacks than wired networks. Dynamic topology, 
cooperative algorithms, lack of centralized monitoring 
and management point also introduce risks to it. 
Moreover, since all its nodes behave as routers and take 
part in its discovery and maintenance of routes to other 
nodes in the network, the significance of node 
cooperation makes network survival particularly sensitive 
to insider node behavior. The presence of selfish or 
malicious nodes could greatly degrade the network 
performance and might even result in a total 
communication breakdown. All of these challenges above 
make new demands to MANET routing protocols. 
Reputation management system [1~4] has been 
proposed to help to enforce node cooperation in ad hoc 
networks. Basically, a reputation management system 
works on evaluating nodes’ quality of behavior based 
on their cooperation (evaluation), distinguishing between 
well-behaved and misbehaving nodes (detection), and 
appropriately reacting to misbehaving nodes (reaction). 
However, few of these proposed cooperation enforcement 
schemes are based on any existing MANET secure 
routing protocols. Most of these proposed schemes were 
based on routing protocols without any security measures 
at all. 
    The purpose of this paper is to design an efficient 
secure on-demand routing protocol integrates with 
reputation system in wireless ad hoc networks. Detailed 
analysis is given to show our scheme can not only ensure 
the security of the routing protocol against most common 
known attacks, but also improve network throughput and 
performance. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
In mobile ad hoc networks, packet forwarding, routing 
and other network basic functions are performed by all 
nodes instead of dedicated ones. Thus, network operation 
can be easily jeopardized if security countermeasures are 
not embedded into basic network functions. Providing 
security for routing protocol in mobile ad hoc networks is 
a challenging task and many researchers have engaged in 
designing various protocols for it. 
In the table Ⅰ, a comparison between some of the 
most established secure routing protocols with respect to 
some performance and security parameters is given[15]. 
The respective meaning of Reac., Proac., Sym. and Asym. 
in the table is reactive, proactive, symmetric and 
asymmetric . 
In addition, a significant number of reputation 
management systems [1～4] have been proposed for ad 
hoc networks. In [1], Watchdog and Pathrater 
components employed to mitigate routing misbehavior 
have been proposed. The watchdog complemented with 
DSR is used for detection of denied packet forwarding 
and the Pathrater is used for rating every candidate path 
and choose appropriate route according to routing policy, 
which enable nodes to avoid malicious nodes included in 
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reputation information with other nodes and only rely on 
their own watchdog exclusively, thus it is inefficient. In 
fact, the focus of this strategy is the throughput of the 
networks. CONFIDANT [2] also uses a reputation system 
to extend reactive routing protocols by isolating 
misbehave nodes. It detects malicious nodes by means of  
observation or reports about several types of 
misbehaviors and thus allows nodes to route around thus 
isolate misbehaved nodes from the network. However, 
the protocol trusts second-hand information 
unconditionally, which can be vulnerabilities in the 
presence of liars. Josang and Ismail [3] use a Bayesian 
approach, which centralizes and discounts the belief in 
second-hand information according to the reputation of 
agents, equating the trustworthiness of an agent as a 
witness with its performance in the base system. However, 
lying nodes that aim at changing the reputation of another 
node can still perform normally in the base system. 
Thus, there is a trade-off problem between efficiency 
in using the available information and robustness against 
false ratings. If the ratings made by others (the second-
hand information) are considered, the reputation system 
can be vulnerable to false accusations or false praise. In 
other words, it would become less robust. If only one’s 
own experience (the first-hand information) is considered, 
the system would be inefficient, either. Thus, how to 
balance robustness and efficiency should be settled first 
in the reputation system. In [5], the author proposed a 
robust and efficient reputation system for Ad Hoc 
networks. It adopts a mechanism that makes use of all the 
available information to enhance the reputation system 
efficiency. To make the reputation system robust, it uses 
the trust ratings and deviation test to deal with false 
ratings. 
 [15] has proposed a reputed authenticated routing for 
ad hoc networks. It is also based on ARAN, however it 
adopts a simple reputation system that only uses the first-
hand reputation in order to avoid false rating from other 
nodes, thus it is inefficient. As a result of these 
comparisons, we ended up choosing to work with ARAN 
[11] as the selected secure routing protocol incorporated 
the reputation system in [5]. 
TABLE I.    
A COMPARISONS OF ESTABLISHED SECURE ROUTING PROTOCOLS IN AD 
HOC NETWORKS 
PROTOCOL 
ITEM 
ARIA
NE 
[10] 
ARAN
[11] 
SEAD 
[12] 
SRP 
[13] 
SAODV
[14] 
Type Reac.  Reac.  Proac.    Reac  Reac. 
Encryption 
Algorithm 
Sym. Asym. Sym.  Sym.  Asym. 
Synchroniza-
tion 
Y N  Y  N  N 
Central Trust  
Authority 
Required 
N Y  Y  Y  Y 
Authentication Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Confidentiality Y  Y  N  N  N 
Integrity Y  Y  N  Y  Y 
Non-
Repudiation 
N Y  Y  N  N 
Anti-Spoofing Y  Y  Y N  Y 
Ⅲ.  REPUTATION SYSTEM 
In this section, we introduce the reputation system we 
adopt in the secure routing briefly. We assume 
communication links are bi-directional. Consider an ad 
hoc network with nodes N = {1,2,…, , …,  }.In our 
approach, a node i  maintains two kinds of ratings about 
every neighboring node
i n
j . In the scheme, 
node calculates the reputation value and trust value 
according to a distribution (called the “prior”) which is 
updated as soon as new observations are made or 
reported. The distribution Beta (
i
, α β ) [6] is used for the 
prior, since it fits Bernoulli distributions and the 
conjugate is also a beta distribution. Moreover, the 
advantage of using the Beta function is that it only needs 
to update two parameters as soon as observations are 
made or reported. 
For clarity, we introduce some denotations in the 
following: 
, ij F : the first-hand reputation rating, which represents 
a summary opinion made by node i about node  j  only 
through its first-hand observation, for example, 
whether j participates the route protocol correctly. It is 
defined by two numbers, say, (  , nn α β ), which represents 
the parameters of the beta distribution assumed by node 
 in its Bayesian view of node i j ’s behavior as an actor in 
the base system. Initially, ( 00 , α β ) is set to (1, 1). 
  : The reputation rating, which shows the synthetic 
opinion maintained by node i  about node 
, ij R
j  ’s behavior 
as an actor in the system according to its first-hand 
observation or second-hand information from other nodes. 
It is also defined by two numbers, say, ( , nn χ η ) and 
( 00 , χ η ) is set to (1, 1) initially. It is updated on two 
cases: (1) when the first-hand reputation rating  , ij F is 
updated; (2) when a reputation rating published by some 
other node , k , kj F , is accepted by i .In the former case, 
the update procedure is the same as for the first-hand , ij F . 
In the latter case, it uses linear pool model merging [7]  to 
incorporate  , kj F . 
, ij T : the trust rating shows node i   ’s opinion about 
how honest node  j is  as an actor in the reputation system, 
for example whether the second-hand information 
published by node  j are likely to be true. It is also 
defined by two numbers, say ( , nn λ ν ) and ( 00 , λ ν ) is set 
to (1, 1) initially.  It uses a similar Bayesian approach as 
, ij F  to update. 
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, ij θ :  the direct reputation value which represents a 
summary opinion made by node i  about  node  j only 
through first-hand observation. 
*
, ij θ = . , () ij EF
*
, ij θ   [0,1] ∈ . 
, ij θ :  the synthetic reputation value which represents a 
summary opinion maintained by node i  about node  j . 
, ij θ = . , () ij ER , ij θ   .  [0,1] ∈
, ij φ :  the trust value shows node i   ’s  summary 
opinion about how honest node  j  is as an actor in the 
reputation system,  , ij φ = . , () ij ET , ij φ [0,1] ∈ . 
To take advantage of second-hand information from 
other nodes, we need a way to incorporate it into the first-
hand information of the node itself. We do this as follows. 
First, whenever node i  makes a first hand observation of 
node j ’s behavior, the first-hand reputation rating , ij F  
and the synthetic reputation rating   are both updated. 
Second, from time to time, nodes publish their first-hand 
reputation rating to other nodes to a subset of the 
neighboring nodes. It is assumed that node i  receives 
first-hand reputation rating 
, ij R
, kj F from about node  k j  .If 
  is classified as “trustworthy” by i  ,  or  if  k , kj F  is 
consistent with   (in a sense that is clarified in latter 
section), then
, ij R
, kj F  is accepted byi  and is used to slightly 
modify the   Else, the   is not updated. In all cases, 
the trust rating  is updated. If 
, ij R , ij R
, ik T , kj F  is accepted byi , 
the trust rating  slightly improves, else it slightly 
worsens. Note that, only first hand information 
, ik T
, ij F  is 
published, neither the reputation  nor the trust ratings  
 is disseminated.  
, ij R
, ij T
The standard Bayesian method [3] is used to 
update , ij F ,  and  then  calculate  , ij R , ij T
*
, ij θ , , ij θ and , ij φ  
accordingly . However, it gives the same weight to each 
observation, regardless of its time of occurrence. We 
want to give less weight to evidence received in the past 
to allow for reputation fading. Thus we use a modified 
Bayesian procedure introducing a discount factor to deal 
with and update in which mends the Bayesian update 
approach by introducing a moving weighted average. We 
take the  , ij F  and 
*
, ij θ for example. 
Node  models the behavior of node  i j as an actor in 
the base system through first-hand observation as follows. 
Node   thinks that node  i j  misbehaves  with 
probability
*
, ij θ . 
*
, ij θ  is unknown, and node i  calculates it 
according to beta distribution. Assume i  makes  one 
individual observation about j . when a new observation 
is made, say with  i s  observed misbehaviors and (1- i s ) 
observed correct behaviors. Let  i s =1 if this observation 
is qualified as misbehavior, and  i s =0 otherwise. Call 
12 , , , n s ss " the sequence of observations. Then  , ij F updates 
as equation(1) (2)： 
1 nn n us α = α − + 01 u ≤≤ ,                (1)         
1 (1 ) nn n us β β − = +− 1 ,                (2)  0 u ≤≤
The weight u is a discount factor for past experiences, 
which serves as the fading mechanism. After  first hand 
observations, we can easily derive from Equation (1) (2) 
that the value of 
n
n α ,  n β is:  
21
12 1
nn
nn n n s us u s u s u α
−
−− = ++ + + + "  
11 2
12 1 1
nn n n
nn uu u u sus u s s β
−− −
− n = ++ + + − − − − − ""  
Obviously, lim( ) nn
n
α β
→∞
+ =
1
1 u −
. Assume 
(temporarily) that 
*
, ij θ   would be constant, it is easy to 
calculate that: 1 E( ) s =  2 E( ) s = =  " E( ) n s =
*
, ij θ . We 
would get
*
, lim E( )
1
ij
n
n u
θ
α
→∞
=
−
, 
*
, 1
lim E( )
1
ij
n
n u
θ
β
→∞
−
=
−
 . 
Thus 0 ε ∀ > , ifε  is small enough. Then 123 ,, nnn ∃ N ∈ ,  
Case:  ,   1 nn ≥
*
, E( )
1
ij
n u
θ
α −
−
ε < ;  
Case:   ,  2 nn ≥
*
, 1
E( )
1
ij
n u
θ
β
−
−
−
ε < ;  
Case:   ,  3 nn ≥
1
()
1
nn u
αβ ε + −<
−
 
Let  1, 2 3 max{ , } tn n n =    when ,  nt ≥
*
, E( )
1
ij
n u
θ
α ≈
−
, E( ) n β ≈
*
, 1
1
ij
u
θ −
−
 , 
1
1
nn u
αβ +≈
−
. Thus 
, ij θ =
()
E[ ]
()
n
nn
α
αβ +
=E( ( , )) nn Beta α β . 
 Using the standard Bayesian approach, after a large 
observation,  m
*
, E( ) ni m j α θ ≈ ， E( ) n β ≈   . 
Thus we should select u so that 
*
, (1 ) ij m θ −
() n E α  and () n E β is also 
inclined to m
**
, ij θ  and
**
, (1 ) ij m θ − . Let 
*
1
1 u
m
=− (
* N m ∈ ) and 
* m =
1
1 u −
is an integer, where 
  is the order of magnitude of the number of 
observations over which we believe it makes sense to 
assume stationary behavior and  >t . 
Thus
* m
* m
**
, E( ) ni j m θ ≈
**
, E( ) (1 ) ni j m βθ ≈− , .   α
In addition, whenever the inactivity time expires, we 
let  1 nn u α α − = and 1 nn u β β − = to decay the values of , α β . 
This is to allow for redemption even in the absence of 
observations, either due retaliatory exclusion or simply 
lack of interaction. 
Every node can use the same procedure to update   
and  then uses these rating to calculate  
, ij R
, ij T , ij θ and  , ij φ . 
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periodically, according to two criteria: (1) well-
behaved/misbehaving (2) trustworthy/untrustworthy. The 
classification process works as follows. First, node i  
updates   and   as explained above. Then Node i  
classifies the behavior and the trustworthiness of node 
, ij R , ij T
j  
of according to the equations (3) and (4): 
,,
,,
well-behaved eta( , )) <
m isbehaving eta( , ))
ij ij n n r
ij ij n n r
if R t
if R t
θχ η
θχ
        =Ε( )=Ε(Β       ⎧ ⎪
η
  ⎨               =Ε( )=Ε(Β ≥ ⎪ ⎩
   (3）                          
                          
It is clear from the above mentioned security analysis 
of the ARAN protocol that ARAN is a secure MANET 
routing protocol providing authentication, message 
integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation by using 
certificates infrastructure. As a consequence, ARAN is 
capable of defending itself against spoofing, fabrication, 
modification, DoS and disclosure attacks. Therefore, 
misbehaving behavior coming from a malicious node will 
be defended against successfully by ARAN. However, 
the currently existing ARAN secure routing protocol does 
not account for attacks that are conducted by 
authenticated selfish nodes as these nodes trust each other 
to cooperate in providing network functionalities. This 
results in that ARAN fails to detect and defend against an 
authenticated selfish node participating in the mobile ad 
hoc network. Thus, if an authenticated selfish node does 
not forward or intentionally drop control or data packets, 
the current specification of ARAN routing protocol can 
not detect or defend against such authenticated selfish 
nodes. This weakness in ARAN specification will result 
in the disturbance of the ad hoc network and the waste of 
the network bandwidth.  
,,
,,
trustworthy eta( , ))<
untrustworthy eta( , ))
ij ij n n u
ij ij n n u
if t
if t
φλ ν
φλ
             =Ε(Τ )=Ε(Β       ⎧ ⎪
⎨               =Ε(Τ )=Ε(Β ≥   ⎪ ⎩ ν   （4）       
Where  and    are the thresholds that the network 
can tolerate. They are set according to requirements of 
the network. These ratings are used to make decisions 
about other nodes. For example, in a mobile ad-hoc 
network, decisions are made about whether to forward for 
another node, which path to choose, whether to avoid 
another node and delete it from the path cache, and 
whether to warn others about another node. The 
misbehaving nodes in our paper comprise malicious 
nodes and selfish nodes. 
r t u t
Ⅳ.  ROUTING PROTOCOL DESIGN 
In this section, we present an analysis of the robustness 
of the Authenticated Routing for Ad Hoc Networks 
(ARAN) in the presence of the different attacks 
introduced firstly[15].    
a)  Unauthorized participation: Since all ARAN packets 
must be signed, a node can not participate in routing 
without authorization from the trusted certificate server. 
This access control therefore rests in the security of the 
trusted authority, the authorization mechanisms employed 
by the trusted authority, the strength of the issued 
certificates, and the revocation mechanism.   
b)  Spoofed Route Signaling: Route discovery packets 
contain the certificate of the source node and are signed 
with the source's private key. Similarly, reply packets 
include the destination node's certificate and signature, 
ensuring that only the destination can respond to route 
discovery. This prevents impersonation attacks where 
either the source or destination node is spoofed. 
c)  Fabricated Routing Messages: Since all routing 
messages must include the sending node's certificate and 
signature, ARAN ensures non-repudiation and prevents 
spoofing and unauthorized participation in routing.   
d)  Alteration of Routing Messages: ARAN specifies 
that all fields of RDP and RREP packets remain 
unchanged between source and destination. Since both 
packet types are signed by the initiating node, any 
alterations in transit would be detected, and the altered 
packet would be subsequently discarded. Thus, 
modification attacks are prevented in ARAN.   
e)  Denial-of-Service Attacks: Denial-of-service (DoS) 
attacks can be conducted by nodes with or without valid 
ARAN certificates. In the certificate-less case, all 
possible attacks are limited to the attacker's immediate 
neighbors because unsigned route requests are dropped. 
However, nodes with valid certificates can conduct 
effective DoS attacks by sending many unnecessary route 
requests and they will go undetected as the current 
existing ARAN protocol can not differentiate between 
legitimate and malicious RREQs coming from 
authenticated nodes. 
Since most of the attacks performed by malicious 
unauthenticated nodes can be detected and defended 
against by the use of the secure routing ARAN protocol, 
we only need to discuss those attacks performed by 
authenticated misbehaving nodes that the ARAN protocol 
can not defend against. We consider the misbehaving 
nodes in our paper comprise malicious nodes and selfish 
nodes. ARAN assumes that authenticated nodes are to 
cooperate and work together to provide the routing 
functionalities. In fact, a selfish node in the ad hoc 
networks can use two possible attacks to save its 
resources: do not participate in routing (do not relay route 
requests or do not relay route replies) and do not relay 
data packets. ARAN fails to detect or defend against 
these attacks, as they focus only on the detection of 
malicious nodes attacks rather than the authenticated 
selfish nodes. Thus, we incorporate the Bayesian-based 
reputation system [5] in a modified ARAN to detect and 
defend these attacks. 
A.  Route Discovery 
We denote the source node, nodes en route, and the 
destination node as S, i (i =1, 2, . . ., n), and D, 
respectively. If a source node S has packets for the 
destination node D, S initiates a route discovery packet 
(RDP) and broadcasts it to its neighbors. Once receiving 
a RDP, intermediate nodes interested in cooperating to 
route this control packet broadcast it in a random delay to 
avoid “broadcast storm” and inserts a record of the source, 
nonce, destination and previous-hop of this packet in its 
routing records.  This process continues until this RDP 
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for each RDP packet that it receives using the reverse-
path. Each intermediate node receiving this RREP 
updates its routing table for the next-hop of the RREP 
and then unicasts this RREP in the reverse-path using the 
earlier-stored previous-hop node information. The 
process repeats until the RREP packet reaches S. Finally, 
S chooses several records from received RREPs and 
stores in its routing table for the D. 
B.   Data Transfer Phase 
After the route discovery, the source node S and the 
other intermediate nodes have several RREPs for the 
same RDP packet. If a source node S has packets for D, S 
chooses the next-hop node, says A, which has the highest 
reputation value from the routing table for data 
transferring then stores its information in the sent-table as 
the path for its data transfer. Then, S will start a timer 
before it should receive a data acknowledgement (DACK) 
from A for this data packet. Afterwards, A will choose 
the next-hop node which has the highest reputation value 
from its routing table and store its information in its sent-
table as the path of this data transfer. If the packet has 
originated from a low-reputed node, the packet is put 
back at the end of the forwarding queue of the current 
node and if the packet has originated from a high-reputed 
node, A sends the data packet to the next hop in the route 
as soon as possible. In addition, A will start a timer, 
before which it should receive the DACK from its next-
hop node for this data packet. This process continues 
until the data packet reaches D. Once the packet reaches 
its destination, the destination node D sends a signed data 
acknowledgement packet (DACK) to the source S. The 
DACK traverses the same route as the data packet, but in 
the reverse direction. 
C. Reputation Phase 
When an intermediate node  receives  a  data 
acknowledgement packet (DACK) from its next-hop
i
j , it 
retrieves the corresponding record inserted in the data 
transfer phase and updates the reputation rating   
using the reputation schemes. Afterwards, it deletes this 
data packet entry from its sent-table. The process repeats 
until the DACK reaches S. 
, ij R
D. Timeout Phase 
Once the timer for a given data packet expires at a 
node  (or S) and i  has not received the DACK from its 
next-hop
i
j ,   deemed that  i j  may be a selfish node. It 
will perform the following operations: 
a)   regard  i j performs a misbehavior and updates  , ij F  
using the reputation scheme; 
b)   broadcast a request packet containing  i , ij F  to the 
each neighbor   of  k j  to ask for  , kj F ;  
c)   and each   uses linear pool model merging [6]  
to update   and  as follows: 
i k
, ij R , kj R
 Assume  node   receives  the  i , kj F = (,) kk α β  from 
node . The question is how to detect and avoid false 
reports. The approach is to employ  and deviation test. 
k
, ik T
If  , ik φ is such that i  considers   trustworthy, k , kj F is 
accepted by node i to modify  , ij R = (,) rr χ η  as follows:  
1 r χ + = , ik j k w α + r χ                    (5)  , 0 ik j w ≤≤ 1
1 r η + = , ik j k w β + r η                     (6)  , 0 ik j w ≤≤ 1
 Where    is a weight factor that that node i  
endows with   when it computes   .   is 
calculated according to the trust value
, ik j w
k , ij R , ik j w
, ik φ .On the 
contrary,  , ik φ is such that i  considers   untrustworthy,   
will use the deviation test to decide whether accept 
k i
, kj F as follows: 
E( , ) E( , ) kk rr α βχ η − δ <                    (7) 
Where δ   is a positive constant that represents 
deviation threshold. If the deviation test turns out 
negative,  , kj F  will not be used as a false rating. Else it is 
incorporated in  using Equation (5) (6). Whether k is 
considered trustworthy by i or not, the deviation test is 
always performed and   would be updated according 
to the test results. In the former case, the deviation test is 
used only to update ; in the latter case, it is used to 
decide whether to incorporate
, ij R
, ik T
, ik T
, kj F  in   and  update 
 as well.  
, ij R
, ik T
d)   and  each  will re-evaluate  i k , ij θ , / kj θ . If 
, / ij kj , θ θ is below  ,  r t j   would be regarded as a 
misbehaving node by i / .  / deactivates  k i k j  in its 
routing table and isolates j  for a time slice. 
e)    sends an error message RERR to the upstream 
nodes in the route and perform “Local Re-routing” 
in below section and try to resend the packet.  
i
E. Selective Node Initialized Re-routing 
In original ARAN, it is the responsibility of the sender 
to reinitiate the route discovery again when a 
misbehaving node is detected in the path. In CSRAN, 
“Local Re-routing” strategy is adopted to enhance the 
efficiency. Once misbehaviors of a selfish or malicious 
node  j en route is detected, the previous-hop i who 
detects will initiate local re-routing destined to D. i  re-
chooses the next-hop node  that has highest reputation 
from the remaining RREPs for the same RDP packet. 
Then i  stores its information in its sent-table as the path 
of this data transfer and tries to resend the packet using 
the new path. This local re-route scheme can reduce the 
overhead caused by re-routing and is more practical 
j
∗
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destination, which is disjoint with the complete old path. 
Ⅴ.  PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION 
The reputation system is key component of the 
schemes, thus it is necessary to analyze its performance. 
We adopt a robust and efficient reputation system [5] 
which make a use of a modified Bayesian procedure to 
incorporate second-hand information into the first-hand 
information to enhance the efficiency of system.  It 
introduces a discount factor for past experiences serving 
as the fading mechanism. To strengthen the robustness of 
the system, it employs the trust ratings of nodes and to 
adopt deviation test to detect and avoid false rating. Each 
node will classify the other neighbor nodes in the 
networks into trustworthy and untrustworthy according to 
trust rating. The information from trustworthy nodes 
would be accepted and the trust value of the node is 
blemished if the rating is false. False ratings from 
untrustworthy nodes would be rejected if it could not pass 
the deviation test. In a word, any malicious action would 
result in the degradation of its trust value thus malicious 
nodes can not submit false ratings for others optionally. 
Then, we give the analysis of the proposed reputation-
based secure routing protocol by discussing different 
forms of attacks and presenting ways of counteracting 
them by the introducing reputation-based scheme. Since 
our scheme is based on ARAN, it is provided with the 
security property that ARAN guarantees. It can defend 
against unauthorized participation, spoofed route 
signaling, fabricated routing messages, alteration of 
routing messages, replay attacks effectively [11]. Since 
most of the attacks performed by malicious 
unauthenticated nodes can be detected and defended 
against by the use of the secure routing ARAN protocol, 
we only need to discuss those attacks performed by 
authenticated misbehaving nodes that the ARAN protocol 
can not defend against. 
Case 1: An authenticated misbehaving node might 
make a false claim of knowing the route to a destination 
and generate a RREP for a destination for which it does 
not have a route. In CSRAN, after receiving the data 
packet to the corresponding destination, the authenticated 
selfish node would not receive the DACK from the 
destination. The previous-hop and the neighbors of this 
selfish node will give a negative rating to its reputation. 
Once the reputation of this selfish node falls below the 
threshold, it will be considered as misbehaving and will 
eventually be isolated. Thus, this attack can be detected 
and defended against by our scheme. 
Case 2: An authenticated misbehaving node might not 
reveal that it knows the route to the destination by not 
replying to or forwarding control packets so that to save 
its resources. This selfish behavior will not be able to 
cause damage to the network directly but it would depress 
the throughput and performance of the network. Our 
scheme employs the reputation system to help to resist 
this type of selfish attack. If the packet has originated 
from a low-reputed node, the packet is assigned 
lowermost priority and if the packet has originated from a 
high-reputed node, the current node sends the data packet 
to the next hop in the route as soon as possible. Hence, 
these selfish nodes will see a considerable increase in 
network latency and it would  be encouraged to 
participate and cooperate in the ad hoc network. 
Case 3: An authenticated misbehaving node might 
promise to route data packets, but then it starts to drop all 
the data packets that it receives. In such a scenario, the 
previous-hop and neighbors of the node will give it a 
negative reputation rating and the reputation of the node 
will be reduced. Eventually, the node will be isolated by 
its neighbors for a period.  
Case 4: An authenticated misbehaving node might 
drop data packets to decrease the throughput of the 
mobile ad hoc network continuously. Since in our scheme, 
the intermediate nodes relay the packets only to highly 
reputed neighbors, it reduces the risk that nodes will 
intentionally drop the packet. As a result, the number of 
packets intentionally dropped is reduced and the 
throughput of the system rises. In other words, our 
scheme encourages the node to cooperate in the network.   
Case 5: Authenticated selfish nodes might collude by 
giving positive recommendations to each other so that to 
increase their reputations. The RARAN [15] prevents this 
attack by having the nodes rely on their own experience 
rather than the experience of their peers. However, it 
would make the reputation system inefficient. In CSRAN, 
the neighbors share and exchange their first-hand 
reputation rating to enhance the efficiency. It also 
employs the trust ratings and deviation test to detect and 
avoid false rating from colluding or malicious nodes. 
since only first hand information  , ij F  is  published  and 
the exchange of reputation information only happens 
among neighboring nodes, thus CSRAN is more efficient 
than [15] 
However, an authenticated well-behaved node might 
become a bottleneck since in the presented reputation-
based scheme the node with the highest reputation is 
always selected as the next hop by its neighbor. As a 
result, the nodes with higher reputations will become 
overloaded, while the other nodes become totally free. 
This problem is solved in the proposed scheme through 
the following procedure:  when authenticated nodes are 
congested and they can not fulfill all control packets 
broadcasted in the MANET, they can choose not to reply 
to other nodes requests in order to do their own assigned 
load according to their battery, performance and 
congestion status.  
We implemented our scheme using the network 
simulator ns-2[7]. For the propagation, we used the two-
ray ground reflection model, while the IEEE 802.11 
Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) was used at the 
MAC layer. Nodes had a physical radio range of 250 m 
and a raw bandwidth of 2 Mbps. We simulated a network 
of 50 nodes randomly placed in an area of 700×700, 
where we randomly selected several nodes that 
misbehave. There are 15 source-destination pairs and 
each source transmits at a Constant Bit Rate (CBR) of 2 
packets, with a packet size of 512 bytes. The simulation 
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Figure1 and 2 shows the performance comparisons of 
in standard DSR [8] and CSRAN (labeled as the trusted 
DSR). The results indicate that the total number of 
packets lost with the trusted DSR always lower than that 
standard DSR despite the increase in misbehaving nodes. 
This is because misbehaving nodes are detected in time 
and bypassed during route discoveries. The lower packet 
loss also helps to maintain a better throughput of the 
network in the presence of misbehaving nodes. These 
results accord with our expectations.  
 
Figure 1:  packet loss comparisons of trusted DSR and 
standard DSR 
 
Figure 2:  throughput comparisons of trusted DSR and 
standard DSR 
Ⅵ. CONCLUSION 
We have proposed a cooperative secure routing 
protocol to prevent and detect malicious attacks and 
selfish behaviors. It is based on ARAN, but it proves to 
be more efficient and more secure than normal ARAN 
secure routing protocol in defending against both 
malicious and authenticated selfish nodes. It adopts a 
robust and efficient reputation system to help enforce the 
security and cooperation of the routing protocol. A 
detailed analysis is given to show our protocol can defend 
against most of the current attacks and the result of our 
simulation shows that CSRAN can help to enhance the 
performance of ad hoc networks. Furthermore, it can also 
locate the misbehaving node on transmit path. 
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